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Abstract
We discuss a value, proposed in the context of cost allocation by Shapley (1981) and
Dehez (2011) and in general by Radzik (2012). This value, we call it Shapley set value,
covers the weighted Shapley values all at once. It is defined on weighted TU-games in
the form of two constituent parts, a weight system and a classical TU-game, where the
weights and the coalition function may vary at the same time. In addition, similar to
the Shapley set value, we introduce the Harsanyi set value. It captures all TU-values
from the Harsanyi set, called Harsanyi payoffs. A player splitting and a players merging
property enable new axiomatizations. Examples recommend both solution concepts for
profit distribution and cost allocation.
Keywords Cost allocation · Profit distribution · Player splitting · Players merging ·
Shapley set· Harsanyi set
1. Introduction
Coalition functions don’t exist in a vacuum and so in many games personal weights are
assigned to the players. Shapley (1953a) spoke of ”differences in the external character-
istics of the players” and suggested the weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a). The
family of all such TU-values is also known as the Shapley set. Each TU-value of this set
incorporates a fixed given weight system.
But often, the weights can depend on the coalition functions as handled in some prob-
lems of profit distribution (earnings per share) or cost allocation (see e. g. Moriarity
(1975)). If, for example, the weights are the singleton worths of the players, one can
apply the formula of a weighted Shapley value. Then she has to change the weighted
Shapley value for a new game if the singleton worths are no longer in the same proportion
as in the old game. This was the idea of the ”Independent Cost Proportional Scheme
(ICPS)” in Gangolly (1981). In effect, instead of a weighted Shapley value, a different
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2value is used, called proportional Shapley Value (Gangolly, 1981; Besner, 2016; Be´al et
al., 2017).
In practice, it does not matter to compute the payoff by the formula of the weighted
Shapley values. But if someone wants to know which axiomatizations the used value has,
for example to argue why a certain value should be selected, she has to identify the correct
value. That we have to change a value if the underlying coalition function is altering is
not a convincing argument to choose a value for calculating. Also, that we cannot apply
the same value in cost games and cost-saving games or in profit games and cooperation
benefit games in the same situation seems unnatural.
All these mentioned lacks do not occur by the Shapley set value (Shapley, 1981; Dehez,
2011; Radzik, 2012). At our knowledge, the first ones who gave attention to the fact that
a value can be defined on weighted TU-games which consist of a TU-game and a weight
system with personally given weights are Shapley (1981) and Dehez (2011)1. So they
introduced weighted cost games and presented particular axiomatizations of a ”weighted
value” in the context of cost allocation. Radzik (2012) formulated the value in general.
This is not a TU-value in the original sense: it takes into account the coalition function
and players’ weights at once. Radzik introduced weighted coalition functions, defined
weighted TU-games and shaped out a value axiomatized by a large group of not logically
independent axioms. Then Radzik called this value ”weighted Shapley value” because
it satisfies adapted well-known axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values in Nowak
and Radzik (1995). But the axioms are adaptions of axioms for TU-games. The value
coincides with weighted Shapley values only on subdomains.
Thus, in some respects, we consider the naming ”weighted Shapley value” as not ac-
curate: On the one hand to avoid name conflicts with the weighted Shapley values for
TU-games and, in our opinion, not the value is weighted, it is rather that we may be able
to regard the coalition functions as weighted. On the other hand, this value, we call it
Shapley set value, satisfies different axioms as the weighted Shapley values, particularly
in the case of subdomains. So it turns out that the Shapley set value captures, e. g., the
proportional Shapley value too.
The weighted Shapley values are obtained by distributing the dividends (Harsanyi,
1959) by weights of a weight system where a player owns for each coalition containing her
the same weight. Hammer (1977) and Vasil’ev (1978) introduced the Harsanyi set, a set of
TU-values called Harsanyi payoffs. For each player exists for each coalition containing her
a possibly different weight. In this system of weights, called sharing system, the weights
of the players for each coalition are non-negative, sum up to one and the dividends have
to be distributed between the players according to these weights.
Similar to the Shapley set value we introduce the Harsanyi set value that covers all
Harsanyi payoffs at once and is defined on sharing TU-games which consist of a TU-game
together with a sharing system at a time. This value also coincides on subdomains with
values which are not in the Harsanyi set.
In the main part of this article, we propose new axiomatizations of the Shapley set value
and the Harsanyi set value. Within these axiomatizations a player splitting property and
a players merging property play a decisive role and may help to close the gap using
cooperative game theory in profit distribution and cost allocation not only in theory but
1Shapley (1981) notes only a comment at an accounting conference that was worked out and proved later
by Dehez (2011).
3also in practice.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries. In Section 3
we provide motivating examples for profit games and refer shortly to an example for cost
games. Section 4 presents axioms for the Shapley set value, gives axiomatizations for
this value and reveals, as a side-benefit, a new axiomatization of the Shapley value. In
Section 5 we transfer our proceeding with the Shapley set value in the previous section
to the Harsanyi set value. Section 6 summarizes the results and gives a conclusion. An
appendix (Section 7) provides all the proofs and shows the logical independence of the
axioms used for axiomatization.
2. Preliminaries
We denote by N the natural numbers, by R the real numbers, by R++ the set of all positive
real numbers, and by Q++ the set of all positive rational numbers. Let U be a countably
infinite set, the universe of all players. We define by N the set of all non-empty and finite
subsets of U. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v)
consisting of a player set N ∈ N and a coalition function v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0. If N
is clear, we refer to a TU-game also by v. We call each subset S ⊆ N a coalition, v(S)
represents the worth of coalition S and we denote by ΩS the set of all non-empty subsets
of S. The set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted by V(N) and, if v({i}) > 0 for
all i ∈ N or if v({i}) < 0 for all i ∈ N , by V0(N). The restriction of (N, v) to N ′ ∈ ΩN
is denoted by (N ′, v).
Let N ∈ N and v ∈ V(N). The dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are defined
inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ ΩN, and
0, if S = ∅.
An unanimity game (N, uS), S ∈ ΩN, is defined for all T ⊆ N by uS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T
and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. It is a well-known fact that each v ∈ V(N) has a unique
presentation
v =
∑
S∈ΩN
∆v(S)uS. (1)
The marginal contribution MCvi (S) of player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i} is defined by
MCvi (S) := v(S ∪ {i})− v(S). A player i ∈ N is called a null player in v if v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}; players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are symmetric in v if v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}, they are called (mutually) dependent (Nowak and
Radzik, 1995) in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) = v(S ∪ {j}); a coalition Q ⊆ N is called a
partnership (Kalai and Samet, 1987) in v if v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N\Q and
T ( Q.
We define by ΛN := {f : N → R++}, λi := λ(i) for all λ ∈ ΛN, i ∈ N , the collection
of all positive weight systems on N and by ΛNQ := {f : N → Q++} the collection of all
positive rational weight systems on N . Let v ∈ V(N) and λ ∈ ΛN. Then vλ := (λ, v)
is called a weighted coalition function and (N, vλ) or short also vλ is said to be a
4weighted TU-game2 (WTU-game). We denote by VΛ(N) the set of all WTU-games
with player set N and by VΛQ(N) the subset of VΛ(N) where λ ∈ ΛNQ .
The collection ΓN on N of all sharing systems γ ∈ ΓN is defined by
ΓN:=
{
γ = (γS,i)S∈ΩN, i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
γS,i = 1 and γS,i ≥ 0 for each S ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ S
}
and the collection ΓNQ on N of all positive rational sharing systems is given by
ΓNQ :=
{
γ = (γS,i)S∈ΩN, i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
γS,i = 1 and γS,i ∈ Q++ for each S ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ S
}
.
Let v ∈ V(N) and γ ∈ ΓN. Then vγ := (γ, v) is called a sharing coalition function and
(N, vγ) or short also vγ is said to be a sharing TU-game (STU-game). We denote by
VΓ(N) the set of all STU-games with player set N , by VΓQ(N) the subset of VΓ(N) where
γ ∈ ΓNQ and by VΓ0(N) the subset of VΓ(N) where γ ∈ ΓN and v ∈ V0(N).
For any N ∈ N , a TU-value ϕ is an operator that assigns to any v ∈ V(N) a
payoff vector ϕ(N, v) ∈ RN, a weighted TU-value (WTU-value) ϕΛ is an operator
that assigns to any vλ ∈ VΛ(N) a payoff vector ϕΛ(N, vλ) ∈ RN and a sharing TU-
value (STU-value) ϕΓ is an operator that assigns to any vγ ∈ VΓ(N) a payoff vector
ϕΓ(N, vγ) ∈ RN.
Let v ∈ V(N) and λ ∈ Λ: The (positively) weighted Shapley Value3 Shλ (Shap-
ley, 1953a) is defined by
Shλi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (2)
The Shapley set is the set of all weighted Shapley values. A special case of a weighted
Shapley value, all weights are equal, is the Shapley value Sh (Shapley, 1953b), given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
The set of the following TU-values is called Harsanyi set (Hammer, 1977; Vasil’ev,
1978), also known as selectope (Derks, Haller, and Peters, 2000), where the payoffs are
obtained by distributing the dividends with the help of a sharing system γ. Each TU-value
Hγ, γ ∈ ΓN, in this set, titled Harsanyi payoff, is defined by
Hγi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
γS,i∆v(S), for all i ∈ N.
Let v ∈ V0(N). The proportional Shapley Value Shp (Gangolly, 1981; Besner, 2016;
Be´al et al., 2017) is defined by
Shpi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
2Radzik (2012) called such a game a ”transferable utility weighted game in characteristic function form.”
3We desist from weights of zero as possible in Kalai and Samet (1987)
5Let vλ ∈ VΛ(N). As a WTU-value, the Shapley set value ShΛ (Shapley, 1981/Dehez,
2011; Radzik, 2012)4 is defined by
ShΛi (N, v
λ) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (3)
Let vγ ∈ VΓ(N). As an STU-value, we introduce the Harsanyi set value HΓ defined by
HΓi (N, v
γ) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
γS,i∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (4)
3. Profit and cost allocation and motivating examples
A cooperative game with a coalition function v commonly represents profits or savings
for all possible coalitions of the player set. Thus in the following we denote by v a profit
game. A profit game is given by a payout function p by
v(S) := p(S)−
∑
i∈S
f({i}) for each S ∈ ΩN, (5)
where f({i}) stands for the (financial) involvement of the player i and p(S) for the
payout to coalition S. Another application for coalition functions are games where the
worths of coalitions represent costs. We denote such cost games by c. Closely related
to cost games are cost-saving games d which give the savings obtained by forming
coalitions and are defined by
d(S) :=
∑
i∈S
c({i})− c(S) for each S ∈ ΩN.
In addition, similar to cost-saving games, we introduce cooperation benefit games q
which are connected to profit games v by
q(S) := v(S)−
∑
i∈S
v({i}) for each S ∈ ΩN (6)
and present the profit of cooperating towards to be lone fighters.
E. g., Amer et al. (2007) claim a coherent solution should exist for both cost and saving
(related) problems, so that all players are indifferent between sharing costs and sharing
savings. That means for a player i we should have
ϕi(c) = c({i})− ϕi(d) for all i ∈ N. (7)
In the same sense, we should have that players are indifferent between sharing profits and
sharing cooperation benefits
ϕi(v) = v({i}) + ϕi(q) for all i ∈ N. (8)
In the following, we give examples of profit sharing and refer to examples of cost allocation
where the usage of the Shapley set value, or, if the weights of players are in different
proportion to each other in some coalitions, the Harsanyi set value is recommended.
4Shapley (1981) and Dehez (2011) denoted this value as ”weighted value” and used it in the context of
cost games, Radzik (2012) denoted this value as ”weighted Shapley value.” We also desist from possibly
null weights and refer in this respect to Section 6.
63.1. Examples for profit allocation
An entrepreneur wants to bridge a short-term need for finance of 50 million monetary units
(MMU) for one year. He is willing to pay 5 percent interest in this year. Additionally, for
some reasons, he prefers as few financiers as possible. Thus, the deposits must be multiples
of 5 million and the entrepreneur pays a bonus of 100, 000 if the deposit amounts not less
then 30 million and a bonus of 500, 000 if the deposit amounts exactly the sum of 50
million. So, we have a payout function p (in MMU) given by
p(f) :=

1.05f, if 5 ≤ f < 30,
1.05f + 0.1, if 30 ≤ f < 50,
1.05f + 0.5, if f = 50,
(9)
where f is the deposit of a financier under the restriction that f = 5k, k ∈ N.
3.1.1. Scenario 1
Three investors, investors A, B, and C, will cooperate to achieve a share of the bonus
too. Therefore, they must occur as one single financier. A wants to make an involvement
about 20 million, B and C prefer to invest in each case 16 million. The investors agree,
that the investor with the larger investment possibilities waives the not needed share of
the optimal deposit (Table 1).
Table 1: Deposits f (MMU)
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
f(S) 20 15 15 19+16=35 19+16=35 15+15=30 18+16+16=50
By (9), we establish a payout function p on N = {A,B,C} where p(S), S ⊆ N, is the
payout to coalition S. By (5), we obtain Table 2 for the related profit game v and, by
(6), Table 3 for the cooperation benefit game q.
Table 2: Profit game v (MMU)
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
v(S) 1 0.75 0.75 1.85 1.85 1.6 3
Table 3: Cooperation benefit game q (MMU)
S {A} {B} {C} {A,B} {A,C} {B,C} {A,B,C}
q(S) 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
The three investors wish to use cooperative game theory to share the benefits. The ideal
would be a one-point solution that not has to be changed if the investments are altering.
B and C propose at first the Shapley value Sh. But A disagrees. A argues that the
Shapley value prefers players with lower deposits and points to the following scenario.
73.1.2. Scenario 2
Investor A splits up in two new investors A1 and A2. With investors A1, A2, B, and C the
deposits f˜ should be given as shown in Table 4 where the sum of the deposits of players
A1 and A2 in coalitions which contain both players equals the deposit of player A in the
related coalitions in Scenario 1.
Table 4: Deposits f˜ (MMU)
S {A1} {A2} {B} {C} {A1, A2} {A1, B} {A1, C} {A2, B} {A2, C}
f˜(S) 10 10 15 15 10+10=20 10+15=25 10+15=25 10+15=25 10+15=25
S {B,C} {A1, A2, B} {A1, A2, C} {A1, B, C} {A2, B, C} {A1, A2, B, C}
f˜(S) 15+15=30 9.5+9.5+16=35 9.5+9.5+16=35 10+15+15=40 10+15+15=40 9+9+16+16=50
We have a new payout function p˜ on N˜ = {A1, A2, B, C} and obtain the profit game v˜ in
Table 5 and the cooperation benefit game q˜ given in Table 6.
Table 5: Profit game v˜ (MMU)
S {A1} {A2} {B} {C} {A1, A2} {A1, B} {A1, C} {A2, B} {A2, C}
v˜(S) 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 1 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
S {B,C} {A1, A2, B} {A1, A2, C} {A1, B, C} {A2, B, C} {A1, A2, B, C}
v˜(S) 1.6 1.85 1.85 2.1 2.1 3
Table 6: Cooperation benefit game q˜ (MMU)
S {A1} {A2} {B} {C} {A1, A2} {A1, B} {A1, C} {A2, B} {A2, C}
q˜(S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S {B,C} {A1, A2, B} {A1, A2, C} {A1, B, C} {A2, B, C} {A1, A2, B, C}
q˜(S) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
Here is a special kind of ”dependency”:
• The worth of any coalition containing both players A1 and A2 in v˜ and q˜ is the same
as the worth of the related coalition containing player A in v and q. Players A1 and
A2 spend together in these coalitions the same investment as player A in the old
coalition, the investments of the other players are not changing.
• In each game the marginal contributions of player A1 or player A2 to any coalition
which does not contain the respective other player are only the singleton worths of
these players. So A1 and A2 are dependent in q˜.
• Coalitions which are the same in both scenarios have the same worth in v and v˜ and
q and q˜ respectively.
8In the sum, splitting player A in players A1 and A2 has no effect on the other players. A
argues that the payoff to not split players should not change in such a case. But this is
not true for the Shapley value (Table 7)! Thus, the investors reject the Shapley value. A
Table 7: Profits (MMU)
Investor A A1 A2 B C
Shapley value Sh(N, v) 1.167 - - 0.917 0.917
Shapley value Sh(N˜ , v˜) - 0.617 0.617 0.883 0.883
Proportional Shapley value Shp(N, v) 1.194 - - 0.903 0.903
Proportional Shapley value Shp(N˜ , v˜) - 0.597 0.597 0.903 0.903
Shapley set value ShΛ(N, vλ) 1.194 - - 0.903 0.903
Shapley set value ShΛ(N˜ , v˜λ˜) - 0.597 0.597 0.903 0.903
Harsanyi set value HΓ(N, vγ) 1.181 - - 0.910 0.910
Harsanyi set value HΓ(N˜ , v˜γ˜) - 0.590 0.590 0.910 0.910
makes the proposal to use the proportional Shapley value Shp that provides the desired
result for profit games (Table 7).
Now B opposed that the players should be also indifferent between sharing profits and
sharing cooperation benefits (eq. 8) where Shp completely fails since the singleton worths
are out of the domain. C suggests a weighted Shapley value Shλ. The Investors agree
that the singleton involvements should be the weights. So they can use formula (2) but
they recognize that the weights are not independent of the involvements and so of the
coalition function. So they have to change the value if the coalition function is altering
which is not the desired approach.
Using the Shapley set value ShΛ they achieve the same result as by Shp (Table 7) for
the profit games and (8) is fulfilled too. But now occurs another problem. Apparently,
the investments of the players differ in some coalitions, and so the weights have to be
adapted. The investors realize that they must apply a sharing system γ ∈ ΓN, given by
γS,i :=
fi(S)
f(S)
, S ∈ ΩN,
and a sharing system γ˜ ∈ ΓN˜, given by
γ˜S,i :=
f˜i(S)
f˜(S)
, S ∈ ΩN˜,
where fi(S), f˜i(S) are the respective shares of the player i in the deposit of coalition
S. However: if they use a Harsanyi payoff Hγ they face the same problem as before
by the weighted Shapley value, the coalition functions and the sharing systems are not
independent and they are forced to change the value if the coalition function is altering.
Finally, all investors reached a consensus to use the Harsanyi set value HΓ that meets all
requirements (Table 7) and it is easy to verify that also (8) is satisfied.
3.2. Examples for cost allocation
We refer to the examples in Besner (2017). There the Shapley value Sh fails if we regard
City 2 after City 1. The proportional Shapley value Shp allocates the unsplit players for
9the cost game in both scenarios the same payoffs. But if we consider (7) as a desirable
requirement, Shp completely fails because in the related cost-saving games the singletons
have a worth of zero. A weighted Shapley value Shλ cannot be applied because the
weights are the singleton worths from the cost game and depend so on the coalition
function. Finally, the Shapley set value ShΛ satisfies all requirements we demand. We
obtain for the cost game the same payoffs as by Shp and it can be easily shown that the
players are indifferent between sharing costs and sharing savings. If there, unlike as in
these examples, the players’ weights differ for some coalitions so that we have to use a
sharing system γ, the Harsanyi set value HΓ is recommended for the usage if γ depends
on the coalition function.
4. The Shapley set value
In general, the set of all weighted Shapley values requires for each value that the fixed
weights are independent of the coalition function because a TU-value must hold for all
coalition functions. Shapley (1981) and Dehez (2011), only in the context of cost games,
and Radzik (2012) introduced a value for weighted TU-games which consist of a TU-
game and a weight system at once. But there is no reference that the weights related to
a coalition function can here depend on it. The weights are not fixed, and the value holds
for all coalition functions and all positive weight systems.
Thus, we have, in particular on some subdomains, no problem as long as the weights
depend on the coalition function in such a way that they are positive. A na¨ıve reader
could think that in the mentioned articles above is just discussed a variety of the weighted
Shapley values. This is not the case. We call this value Shapley set value since it coincides
with values from the Shapley set on certain subdomains. But also it captures values which
are not in the Shapley set. The following subsections are intended to demonstrate the
differences. As Aristotle said: ”The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”
4.1. Axioms for TU-values
We refer to the following standard axioms for TU-values ϕ:
Efficiency, E. For all v ∈ V(N), we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all v ∈ V(N) and i ∈ N such that i is a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v) = 0.
Linearity, L. For all v, w ∈ V(N) and α ∈ R, we have
ϕ(N,αv + w) = αϕ(N, v) + ϕ(N,w).
Additivity, A. For all v, w ∈ V(N), we have ϕ(N, v) + ϕ(N,w) = ϕ(N, v + w).
λ-weighted proportionality, WPλ (Nowak and Radzik, 1995)5. For all v ∈ V(N),
i, j ∈ N such that i and j are dependent in v and λ ∈ Λ, we have
ϕi(N, v)
λi
=
ϕj(N, v)
λj
.
5This is the essential part of the ω-Mutual Dependence axiom in (Nowak and Radzik, 1995).
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4.2. Radzik’s axioms for WTU-values
Radzik (2012) presented a lot of axioms for WTU-values. One of these axioms requires
an additional player set. Radzik introduced for a fixed coalition Q ∈ ΩN a new player set
NQ := (N\Q) ∪ {Q} where Q is regarded as a single player and so {Q} is a singleton.
Then he defined for this player set a new WTU-game, related to the old game. To avoid
any misunderstanding, in the following definition we denote the coalition Q by q if we
treat Q as a player.
Definition 4.1. (Radzik, 2012) Let Q ∈ ΩN, q := Q if Q is regarded as a player, NQ :=
(N\Q) ∪ {q}, (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N). The game (NQ, (vλ)Q) ∈ VΛ(NQ), (vλ)Q := (λQ, vQ), is
called a merged players WTU-game6 (MPW-game) to (N, vλ) if for all S ⊆ N\Q
• λQk = λk if k ∈ NQ\{q} and λQq =
∑
i∈Q λi,
• vQ(S)= v(S),
• vQ(S ∪ {q}) = v(S ∪Q).
The following axioms for WTU-values ϕΛ come from Radzik (2012):
EfficiencyΛ, EΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N), we have ∑i∈N ϕΛi (N, vλ) = v(N).
Null playerΛ, NΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and i ∈ N such that i is a null player in v, we
have ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = 0.
AdditivityΛ (in the coalition function), AΛ. For all vλ, wλ ∈ VΛ(N), we have ϕΛ(N, vλ)+
ϕΛ(N,wλ) = ϕΛ(N, (v + w)λ).
LinearityΛ (in the coalition function), LΛ. For all vλ, wλ ∈ VΛ(N) and α ∈ R, we have
ϕΛ(N, (αv + w)λ) = αϕΛ(N, vλ) + ϕΛ(N,wλ).
Weight proportionalityΛ, WPΛQ . For all v
λ ∈ VΛ(N), Q ∈ ΩN such that Q is a part-
nership in v and i ∈ Q, we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ)
λi
= const.
MarginalityΛ (in the coalition function), MΛ. For all vλ, wλ ∈ VΛ(N) and i ∈ N such
that MCvi (S) = MC
w
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have ϕΛi (N, vλ) = ϕΛi (N,wλ).
Amalgamating payoffsΛ, APΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N), Q ∈ ΩN a partnership in v, q :=
Q if Q is regarded as a player and
(
NQ, (vλ)Q
) ∈ VΛ(NQ) an MPW-game to vλ, we have∑
i∈Q
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛq
(
NQ, (vλ)Q
)
.
ContinuityΛ, CΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and α ∈ R, we have ϕΛ(N,αvλ) is a continuous
function of variable α.
Remark 4.2. Note that AΛ, L Λ, and M Λ hold only in the coalition function and there-
fore only on subdomains. The weight systems must always be equal.
6In Radzik (2012) this game is only mentioned as a reduced weighted game.
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4.3. Additional axioms for WTU-values
Besner (2017) introduced a corresponding split player game for TU-games where a fixed
player is split in two new players. In analogy, we define a split player game for WTU-
games. In contrast to the MPW-game, in the split player game the new players are
completely independent of the ”split” player in the original game apart from the given
properties in the following definition.
Definition 4.3. Let j ∈ N, N j := (N\{j})∪ {k, `}, k, ` ∈ U, k, ` /∈ N, (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N).
The game
(
N j, (vλ)j
) ∈ VΛ(N j), (vλ)j := (λj, vj), is called a split player WTU-game
(SPW-game) to (N, vλ) if for all S ⊆ N\{j}
• λjk + λj` = λj and λji = λi if i ∈ N\{j},
• vj(S ∪ {m}) = v(S) if m ∈ {k, `},
• vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = v(S ∪ {j}),
• vj(S) = v(S).
Remark 4.4. Regard that the players k and ` are dependent in vj.
In the following we present additional axioms for WTU-values ϕΛ:
Equal-weighted symmetryΛ, EWSΛ (Shapley, 1981). For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N), i, j ∈ N
such that i and j are symmetric in v and λi, λj ∈ ΛN with λi = λj, we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛj (N, v
λ).
Null player outΛ 7, NOΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and j ∈ N such that j is a null player in
v, we have ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛi (N\{j}, vλ) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Weighted proportionalityΛ, WPΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N) and i, j ∈ N such that i and
j are dependent in v, we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ)
λi
=
ϕΛj (N, v
λ)
λj
.
Weighted standardnessΛ 8, WSΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N), N = {i, j}, i 6= j, we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = v({i}) + λi
λi + λj
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
Players mergingΛ, PMΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N), k, ` ∈ N two dependent players in v,
and
(
N{k,`}, (vλ){k,`}
) ∈ VΛ(N{k,`}) an MPW-game to (N, vλ), we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛi
(
N{k,`}, (vλ){k,`}
)
for all i ∈ N\{k, `}.
Player splittingΛ, PSΛ. For all vλ ∈ VΛ(N), j ∈ N , and (N j, (vλ)j) ∈ VΛ(N j) an
SPW-game to (N, vλ), we have
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) = ϕΛi
(
N j, (vλ)j
)
for all i ∈ N\{j}.
7This axiom is part of the dummy elimination axiom in (Shapley, 1981) and comes as a TU-axiom from
(Derks and Haller, 1999).
8This axiom comes from the w-proportional property for two-person games in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989).
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PMΛ states that the players’ payoffs do not change if some other dependent players merge
into one new player who has the same impact to the game as the old merging players,
PSΛ states that the players’ payoffs do not change if another player splits into two new
dependent players who have the same impact to the new game as the original player in
the old one.
Remark 4.5. It is easy to see that WPΛQ is equivalent to WP
Λ. Hereafter, we use only
the shortcut WP Λ.
The players merging and the player splitting property, both pick up the idea in Banker
(1981) that splitting up a cost center or merging cost centers should not change the
allocation of costs to the remaining cost centers. We can interpret the procedure of
amalgamating players in the amalgamating payoffs axiom as a form of adapting the idea
in Lehrer (1988) that the new players get together the same payoff as the old split player.
Here, if the WTU-value is efficient, Lehrer’s idea is satisfied too.
Remark 4.6. Let N ∈ N , vλ ∈ VΛ(N), j ∈ N , and (N j, (vλ)j) ∈ VΛ(N j) an SPW-game
to (N, vλ). If ϕΛ is a WTU-value which satisfies E Λ and PS Λ, we have
ϕΛk
(
N j, (vλ)j
)
+ ϕΛ`
(
N j, (vλ)j
)
= ϕΛj (N, v
λ) for k, ` ∈ N j, k, ` /∈ N.
4.4. Subdomains
Any TU-value ignores weights which potentially are allocated to the players and are not
considered within the definition of the value. Thus, we can reformulate each TU-value in
a WTU-value:
Remark 4.7. Let vλ ∈ VΛ(N). Each TU-value ϕ coincides with a WTU-value ϕΛ by
ϕΛi (N, v
λ) := ϕi(N, v) for all i ∈ N, in particular, we have for a weighted Shapley value
Shλ
′
, λ′ ∈ ΛN, (Shλ′i )Λ(N, vλ) := Shλ′i (N, v) for all i ∈ N.
At first glance, the Shapley set value looks very similar to a weighted Shapley value. But
for one thing, we have only one value for all weight systems λ, whereas the weight system
used in a weighted Shapley value is fixed, and secondly, for some subdomains the weights
can be correlated to coalition functions. For different subdomains, this value coincides
with different values.
Remark 4.8. Let λ′ ∈ ΛN and VΛλ′ (N) the set of all WTU-games (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N) with
λ := λ′. ShΛ coincides on VΛλ′ (N) with the weighted Shapley value Shλ′.
Even by a weighted Shapley value, on some (small) subdomains the weights can be re-
garded as not independent of the coalition function, e. g. if the weights of the players
are in the same proportion to each other as the singleton worths. If the weights are all
equal, the special case that a weighted Shapley value coincides with the Shapley value,
the weighted Shapley value coincides with the proportional Shapley value on the subset
of all coalition functions where all singletons have the same positive worth. But altering
the coalition function where the weights depend on it usually leads to a problem: we have
to change the weighted Shapley value too. Thus, in general, we require that the weights
for a weighted Shapley value are independent of the coalition function.
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This is unnecessary for the Shapley set value. On some subdomains this value coincides
with non-linear values, so on the subdomain that contains all coalition functions with only
positive or negative singleton worths and where the weights of the players are restricted
to the singleton worths of the related coalition functions.
Remark 4.9. For all v ∈ V0(N) let λv ∈ ΛN such that λvi := |v({i})| for all i ∈ N and
let VΛλv0 (N) the set of all WTU-games (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N) with λ := λv and v ∈ V0(N).
ShΛ coincides on VΛλv0 (N) with the proportional Shapley value Shp.
Casajus (2017) presented a huge class of TU-values ϕω, ω ∈ Ω, Ω := {f : R×U→ R++},
given by
ϕωi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
ω(v({i}), i)∑
j∈S ω(v({j}), j)
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ V(N).
With the weight functions ω ∈ Ω we can generalize the previous two remarks.
Remark 4.10. Let ω ∈ Ω, λωv ∈ Λn such that λωvi := ω(v({i}), i) for all i ∈ N , and all
v ∈ V(N) such that v({i}) is in the domain of ω for all i ∈ N , and let VΛλωv(N) the set
of all WTU-games (N, vλ) ∈ VΛ(N) with λ := λωv and v ∈ V(N) such that v({i}) is in
the domain of ω for all i ∈ N . ShΛ coincides on VΛλωv(N) with ϕω.
4.5. Inherited axiomatizations
In the introducing text section to Radzik (2012, Theorem 3.2) are, inter alia, the following
two collections of axioms,
C1 : EΛ, LΛ, NΛ, and WPΛ,
C2 : EΛ, MCΛ, and WPΛ.
It is easy to see that the Shapley set value inherits analogous axiomatizations from the
weighted Shapley values in Nowak and Radzik (1995).
Theorem 4.11. ShΛ is the unique WTU-value which is determined by any of the collec-
tions of axioms C1 and C2.
We omit the proof since the related axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values in
Nowak and Radzik (1995) can be easily adapted and extended to a proof of Theorem 4.11.
Remarks 4.12. Obviously, the value φ∗ in Radzik (2012, Theorem 3.1) coincides with
the Shapley set value ShΛ. But we cannot agree that the value φ0(λ, v) = {φN0 (λ, v) :
N ∈ N} in Radzik (2012, Theorem 3.2) is a weighted Shapley value: From a purely
formal point of view, the value φ0(λ, v) is a WTU-value and not a TU-value. If the
notion of the value φ0(λ, v) is not correct and this value is meant as a TU-value and λ
is a fixed weight system, the value does not meet the axioms for WTU-values in C1 and
C2. If a corresponding WTU-value to the weighted Shapley values is meant as discussed
in Remark 4.7, Remark 4.8, this value coincides with the Shapley set value only on a
subdomain. Also, if we regard the set of the WTU-values which coincides with the set of
all weighted Shapley values, no value of this set meets, e. g., WPΛ on the whole range of
the required domain.
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4.6. Additivity can replace linearity
In Radzik (2012, Remark 4.6) is pointed out that LΛ can be weakened to AΛ if we replace
LΛ by AΛ and add CΛ. The following theorem and the next corollary are showing that we
need only AΛ for the collection C1 in Theorem 4.11 above and so also in Radzik (2012,
Theorem 3.1).
Theorem 4.13. Let λ ∈ ΛN. Shλ is the unique TU-value that satisfies E, N, WPλ, and
A.
By Theorem 4.13, Remark 4.8, and since the proof of Theorem 4.13 holds for all λ ∈ Λ,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.14. ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies E Λ, N Λ, WP Λ, and AΛ.
4.7. Insertion
We introduce a special case of the λ-weighted proportionality property WPλ, all weights
are equal. Two dependent players get the same payoff.
Dependency, D. For all v ∈ V(N) and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are dependent in v,
we have ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v).
By Theorem 4.13 we obtain the following corollary for the Shapley value.
Corollary 4.15. Sh is the unique TU-value that satisfies E, N, D, and A.
This axiomatization is weaker than the well-known axiomatization in Shapley (1953b) by
efficiency, symmetry, additivity and the null player property because symmetry implies
dependency but not vice versa.
4.8. Player splitting
In our examples, Scenario 2, we can interpret the game q˜ as an SPW-game to game q in
Scenario 1. The payoff to not involved players calculated by the Shapley set value ShΛ
is in Scenario 2 the same as in Scenario 1 as required in PSΛ. This holds for the Shapley
set value in general.
Lemma 4.16. ShΛ satisfies PS Λ.
The following lemma shows dependence on EWSΛ for efficient values which meet PSΛ.
Lemma 4.17. If a WTU-value ϕΛ satisfies E Λ and PS Λ then ϕΛ satisfies also EWS Λ.
The next lemma makes use of Lemma 4.17 in the proof.
Lemma 4.18. Let vλ ∈ VΛQ(N). If a WTU-value ϕΛ satisfies E Λ and PS Λ then ϕΛ
satisfies also WP Λ.
We obtain by Lemma 4.16, Lemma 4.18, and Corollary 4.14 the following corollary.
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Corollary 4.19. Let vλ ∈ VΛQ(N). ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies E Λ, N Λ,
PS Λ, and AΛ.
By Lemma 4.18 and Theorem 4.11 with regard to the collection of axioms C2 we get
another corollary.
Corollary 4.20. Let vλ ∈ VΛQ(N). ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies E Λ,
PS Λ, and M Λ.
Remark 4.21. Lemma 4.18 holds for vλ ∈ VΛ(N) if we require continuity of ϕΛ in λ for
all λ ∈ ΛN in an additional axiom. Thus also Corollary 4.19 and Corollary 4.20 are valid
for vλ ∈ VΛ(N) if there is in each case an additional continuity axiom.
4.9. Players merging
The Shapley set value and the players merging property fit together well.
Lemma 4.22. ShΛ satisfies PM Λ.
Since it is easy to adapt the proof from Lemma 4.16 the proof is omitted. It follows an
axiomatization that uses the players merging property.
Theorem 4.23. ShΛ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies NO Λ, PM Λ, WS Λ, and
AΛ.
5. The Harsanyi set value
The same considerations as for the weighted Shapley values in the introduction of Section 4
apply similarly for the Harsanyi payoffs Hγ. These values require a fixed sharing system.
If the sharing system depends on the coalition function, we can use the Harsanyi set value
HΓ without changing the value for each altered coalition function.
5.1. Axioms for STU-values
To transfer axioms for WTU-values into axioms for STU-values, we need two definitions
we already know as definitions in the version for WTU-values.
Definition 5.1. Let Q ∈ ΩN, q := Q if Q is regarded as a player, NQ := (N\Q) ∪
{q}, (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N). The game (NQ, (vγ)Q) ∈ VΓ(NQ), (vγ)Q := (γQ, vQ), is called a
merged players STU-game (MPS-game) to (N, vγ) if for all S ⊆ N\Q
• γQS,k = γS,k, k ∈ S,
• γQS∪{q},k =
{
γS∪Q,k, if k ∈ S,∑
i∈Q γS∪Q,i if k = q,
• vQ(S)= v(S),
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• vQ(S ∪ {q}) = v(S ∪Q)
Definition 5.2. Let j ∈ N, N j := (N\{j}) ∪ {k, `}, k, ` ∈ U, k, ` /∈ N, (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N).
The game
(
N j, (vγ)j
) ∈ VΓ(N j), (vγ)j := (γj, vj), is called a split player STU-game
(SPS-game) to (N, vγ) if for all S ⊆ N\{j}, i ∈ S, m ∈ {k, `},
• γjS,i = γS,i, γjS∪{k,`},k + γjS∪{k,`},` = γS∪{j},j and γjS∪{k,`},i = γS∪{j},i,
• vj(S ∪ {m}) = v(S),
• vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = v(S ∪ {j}),
• vj(S) = v(S).
Remark 5.3. In definition 5.2 the shares of all players from a coalition (S ∪{m}) which
contains only one split player are arbitrary within the domain of a sharing system.
Remark 5.4. In definition 5.2 the players k and ` are dependent in vj.
Our axioms for STU-values ϕΓ are simple adaptions of the related axioms for WTU-values.
EfficiencyΓ, EΓ. For all vγ ∈ VΓ(N), we have ∑i∈N ϕΓi (N, vγ) = v(N).
Null player outΓ, NOΓ. For all vγ ∈ VΓ(N) and j ∈ N such that j is a null player in v,
we have ϕΓi (N, v
γ) = ϕΓi (N\{j}, vγ) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
AdditivityΓ(in the coalition function), AΓ. For all vγ, wγ ∈ VΓ(N), we have ϕΓ(N, vγ) +
ϕΓ(N,wγ) = ϕΓ(N, (v + w)γ).
Weighted standardnessΓ, WSΓ. For all vγ ∈ VΓ(N), N = {i, j}, i 6= j, we have
ϕΓi (N, v
γ) = v({i}) + γN,i
γN,i + γN,j
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
Players mergingΓ, PMΓ. For all vγ ∈ VΓ(N), k, ` ∈ N two dependent players in v, and(
N{k,`}, (vγ){k,`}
) ∈ VΓ(N{k,`}) an MPS-game to (N, vγ), we have
ϕΓi (N, v
γ) = ϕΓi
(
N{k,`}, (vγ){k,`}
)
for all i ∈ N\{k, `}.
Player splittingΓ, PSΓ. For all vγ ∈ VΓ(N), j ∈ N , and (N j, (vγ)j) ∈ VΓ(N j) an SPS-
game to (N, vγ), we have
ϕΓi (N, v
γ) = ϕΓi
(
N j, (vγ)j
)
for all i ∈ N\{j}.
5.2. Subdomains
Similar to the WTU-values we can reformulate each TU-value also in an STU-value:
Remark 5.5. Let vγ ∈ VΓ(N). Each TU-value ϕ coincides with an STU-value ϕΓ by
ϕΓi (N, v
γ) := ϕi(N, v) for all i ∈ N, in particular, we have for a Harsanyi payoff Hγk, γk ∈
ΓN, (Hγ
k
i )
Γ(N, vγ) := Hγ
k
i (N, v) for all i ∈ N.
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The Harsanyi set value looks very similar to a Harsanyi payoff too. But for one thing,
we have only one value for all sharing systems γ, whereas the sharing system used in a
Harsanyi payoff is fixed, and secondly, for some subdomains the sharing systems γ can be
correlated to the coalition functions. On different subdomains, this value coincides with
different values.
Remark 5.6. Let γ′ ∈ ΓN and VΓγ′(N) the set of all STU-games (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N) with
γ := γ′. HΓ coincides on VΓγ′ (N) with the Harsanyi payoff Hγ′.
Remark 5.7. Let λ ∈ ΛN and γλ ∈ ΓN such that
γλT,i :=
λi∑
j∈T λj
, T ∈ ΩN, i ∈ T,
and let VΓγλ(N) the set of all STU-games (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N) with γ := γλ. HΓ coincides on
VΓγλ (N) with the weighted Shapley value Shλ.
Remark 5.8. For all λ ∈ ΛN let γλ ∈ ΓN such that
γλT,i :=
λi∑
j∈T λj
, T ∈ ΩN, i ∈ T,
ΓΛ(N) := {γλ : λ ∈ ΛN}, and let VΓΛ(N) the set of all STU-games (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ(N) with
γ ∈ ΓΛ(N). HΓ coincides on VΓΛ(N) with the Shapley set value ShΛ.
Thus, the Harsanyi set value coincides with non-linear values on some subdomains too.
Remark 5.9. Let v ∈ V0(N) and γv ∈ ΓN such that
γvT,i :=
v({i})∑
j∈T v({j})
, T ∈ ΩN, i ∈ T,
and let VΓγv0 (N) the set of all STU-games (N, vγ) ∈ VΓ0(N) with γ := γv. HΓ coincides on
VΓγv0 (N) with the proportional Shapley value Shp.
5.3. Axiomatizations
Lemma 5.10. HΓ satisfies E Γ, NO Γ, PS Γ, PM Γ, WS Γ, and AΓ.
In contrary to Corollary 4.19, the next theorem needs the null player out property instead
of the null player property.
Theorem 5.11. Let vγ ∈ VΓQ(N). HΓ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies E Γ, NO Γ,
PS Γ, and AΓ.
Remark 5.12. Similar to Remark 4.21, Theorem 5.11 holds for vγ ∈ VΓ(N) if we require
continuity of ϕΓ in γ for all γ ∈ ΓN in an additional axiom.
Our last axiomatization can be transferred from Theorem 4.23 one to one.
Theorem 5.13. HΓ is the unique WTU-value that satisfies NO Γ, PM Γ, WS Γ, and AΓ.
The proof is omitted because it can be transmitted one to one from the proof of Theo-
rem 4.23.
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6. Conclusion and discussion
In this article, we have carved out the differences between the weighted Shapley values
and the Shapley set value and between the Harsanyi payoffs and the Harsanyi set value.
The introduced player splitting and players merging properties lead to convincing ax-
iomatizations, particularly in the context of profit and cost allocation. Nevertheless, all
presented axiomatizations hold only on the given domains and using subdomains would
lead to other axiomatizations in general.
It should be mentioned and is easy to proof, besides the axiomatizations in Radzik
(2012) and Shapley (1981)/Dehez (2011), that the Shapley set value, e. g., also satisfies
adaptions for WTU-values from the well-known axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley
values given in Myerson (1980)/Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) by efficiency and weighted
balanced contributions and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) by consistency and weighted stan-
dardness.
The amalgamating payoffs property allows an interesting axiomatization too. Whereas
in the axiomatization in Radzik (2012, Theorem 3.1) APΛ is redundant, it is clear, ap-
plying ideas from the proof of Theorem 4.23, that ShΛ (HΓ) can be axiomatized by EΛ,
NOΛ, APΛ, WSΛ, and AΛ (EΓ, NOΓ, APΓ, WSΓ, and AΓ). Here APΛ is not redundant.
Look for this, e. g., to the WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, |S|≤2
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, |S|≥3
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N,
which meets EΛ, NOΛ, WSΛ, and AΛ and does not match APΛ. But it is still an open
question if all axioms are logically independent.
We desisted from weights of zero for the Shapley set value. If one wants to allow zero-
weights, we recommend the Harsanyi set value. In accordance with Kalai and Samet
(1987), one has to specify the weights for coalitions where all players have originally a
weight of zero how to share in this case the dividend of these coalitions. The sharing
weights of the players for all other coalitions can be handled by the given proportion of
the original weights. So we have also valid axiomatizations (for the Harsanyi set value) in
contrast to the axiomatizations for the Shapley set value as stressed out in the concluding
remarks in Dehez (2011).
7. Appendix
The following remark is used in some proofs.
Remark 7.1. Players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are dependent in v ∈ V(N), iff ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0,
k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
7.1. Proof of Theorem 4.13
Let λ ∈ ΛN and v ∈ V(N). It is well-known that Shλ satisfies all axioms from Theo-
rem 4.13. So, due to property (1) and A, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely defined
on games vS := ∆v(S) · uS, S ∈ ΩN.
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Let S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ a value that satisfies all axioms from Theorem 4.13. All
players j ∈ N\S are null players in vS and so ϕ is unique on vS for all j ∈ N\S by N.
Thus, if S is a singleton, ϕ is unique on vS by E. Let now |S| ≥ 2. By Remark 7.1 all
i ∈ S are dependent in vS and therefore, by E and WP, ϕ is also unique on vS for all
i ∈ N .
7.2. Proof of Lemma 4.16
Let vλ ∈ VΛ(N), j ∈ N , and (N j, (vλ)j) an SPW-game to (N, vλ). We point out that
we have for all S ∈ ΩN\{j}, ∆vj(S) = ∆v(S), ∆vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = ∆v(S ∪ {j}), and, by
Remark 7.1, ∆vj(S ∪ {k}) = ∆vj(S ∪ {`}) = 0. Then we get for all i ∈ N\{j}
ShΛi (N, v
λ) =
(3)
∑
R⊆N,R3i
λi∑
m∈R λm
∆v(R)
=
∑
S⊆N\{j}, S3i
λi∑
m∈S λm
∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N\{j}, S3i
λi∑
m∈S∪{j} λm
∆v(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`},
S3i
λji∑
m∈S λ
j
m
∆vj(S) +
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`},
S3i
λji∑
m∈S∪{k,`} λ
j
m
∆vj(S ∪ {k, `})
=
∑
R⊆Nj, R3i
λji∑
m∈R λ
j
m
∆vj(R) = Sh
Λ
i
(
N j, (vλ)j
)
.
7.3. Proof of Lemma 4.17
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} ∈ N , n ≥ 2, vλ ∈ VΛ(N), ϕΛ a WTU-value that satisfies EΛ
and PSΛ and, w.l.o.g., player 1 and player 2 symmetric in v with λ1 = λ2. We split
player 1, according to PSΛ, into two new players, player n + 1 and player n + 2, N1 :=
{2, 3, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2}, and obtain
ϕΛ2
(
N1, (vλ)1
)
= ϕΛ2 (N, v
λ), (10)
and, if we split player 2, according to PSΛ, into the same players as before, player n+ 1
and player n+ 2, instead, N2 := {1, 3, 4, ..., n, n+ 1, n+ 2}, we have
ϕ1
(
N2, (vλ)2
)
= ϕ1(N, v
λ), (11)
where we choose λ2n+1 := λ
1
n+1 := λ
2
n+2 := λ
1
n+2.
In the same manner, we split now in the game
(
N1, (vλ)1
)
player 2 into two new players,
player n+3 and player n+4, and analogous in the game
(
N2, (vλ)2
)
player 1 into the same
players as before, player n+3 and player n+4, and choose λ2
1
n+3 := λ
12
n+3 := λ
21
n+4 := λ
12
n+4.
We have N1
2
= N2
1
= {3, 4, ..., n, n + 1, n + 2, n + 3, n + 4} and (vλ)12 = (vλ)21 and
obtain by EΛ, according to remark 4.6,
ϕn+3
(
N1
2
, (vλ)1
2
)
+ ϕn+4
(
N1
2
, (vλ)1
2
)
= ϕ2
(
N1, (vλ)1
)
=
(10)
ϕ2(N, v
λ),
ϕn+3
(
N2
1
, (vλ)2
1
)
+ ϕn+4
(
N2
1
, (vλ)2
1
)
= ϕ1
(
N2, (vλ)2
)
=
(11)
ϕ1(N, v
λ).
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Hence follows ϕ1(N, v
λ) = ϕ2(N, v
λ) and EWSΛ is shown.
7.4. Proof of Lemma 4.18
Let N ∈ N , |N | ≥ 2, vλ ∈ VΛQ(N), ϕΛ a WTU-value that satisfies EΛ and PSΛ and
therefore, by Lemma 4.17, also EWSΛ and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are dependent in
v. Due to λi, λj ∈ Q++ the weights λk, k ∈ {i, j}, can be written as a fraction
λk =
pk
qk
with pk, qk ∈ N.
We choose a main denominator q of these two fractions by q := qiqj. With zi := piqj and
zj := pjqi we get
λi =
zi
q
and λj =
zj
q
. (12)
Applying PSΛ (repeatedly) to (N, vλ) and the two players i, j we can obtain the WTU-
game (N ′, (vλ)′) where each player k, k ∈ {i, j}, is split in zk players k1 to k(zk), such
that N ′ = (N\{i, j}) ∪ {im : 1 ≤ m ≤ zi} ∪ {jm : 1 ≤ m ≤ zj} and each player
km ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}), 1 ≤ m ≤ zk, get a singleton worth v′({km}) := 0 for k ∈ {i, j}, with
a weight λkm :=
1
q
where
∣∣N ′\(N\{i, j})∣∣ = z1 + z2.
All players ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}) are symmetric in v′ and have the same weights. Hence
follows by EWSΛ and EΛ
ϕ`(N
′, (vλ)′) =
ϕi(N, v
λ) + ϕj(N, v
λ)
zi + zj
for ` ∈ N ′\(N\{i, j}). (13)
We get
ϕk(N, v
λ) =
(13)
∑
1≤m≤zk
ϕkm(N
′, (vλ)′) =
zk
zi + zj
[
ϕi(N, v
λ) + ϕj(N, v
λ)
]
for k ∈ {i, j}.
It follows
ϕi(N, v) =
zi
zj
ϕj(N, v
λ) =
(12)
λi
λj
ϕj(N, v)
and WPΛ is shown.
7.5. Proof of Theorem 4.23
Let vλ ∈ VΛ(N). By (3), Lemma 4.22, and corollary 4.14, it is clear that ShΛ satisfies all
axioms from Theorem 4.23. Thus, we have only to show uniqueness.
Let ϕ a value that satisfies all axioms from Theorem 4.23. If |N | = 2, ϕ is unique on
vλ by WSΛ. Let now be one player i ∈ N a null player. Then, by NOΛ, ϕ is unique on
({j}, vλ) for the other player j ∈ N , but then also for |N | = 1 in general.
Let now |N | ≥ 3. Due to property (1) and AΛ, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely
defined on games vλS with vS := ∆v(S) · uS, S ∈ ΩN.
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Let S ∈ ΩN, S 6= N . By Remark 7.1, all j ∈ S are dependent in vS and all k ∈ N\S
are null players in vS. If we delete, by NO
Λ, all but one null player k ∈ N\S and merge
all players j ∈ S according to PMΛ, step by step, we get, by WSΛ, that ϕ is unique on vλS
for the null player k and since k was arbitrary, that ϕ is unique on vλS for all null players
k ∈ N\S.
Now we delete all null players k ∈ N\S or we have S = N . By NOΛ, we have
ShΛj (S, v
λ) = ShΛj (N, v
λ) for all j ∈ S. If |S| = 1, ϕ is unique on vλS as shown above.
Let now |S| ≥ 2 and i ∈ S. We merge all players j ∈ S\{i} by PMΛ, step by step,
and obtain ϕΛi (N, v
λ
S) = ϕ
Λ
i
(
SS\{i}, (vλS)
S\{i}). By WSΛ, ϕΛi (SS\{i}, (vλS)S\{i}) is unique on
(vλS)
S\{i}. Therefore ϕΛi (N, v
λ
S) is unique on v
λ
S. Since i ∈ S was arbitrary, ϕΛ is unique
for all i ∈ S and Theorem 4.23 is shown.
7.6. Proof of Lemma 5.10
Obviously, by (4), HΓ satisfies EΓ, NOΓ, WSΓ, and AΓ.
We show that HΓ meets PSΓ. Let vγ ∈ VΓ(N), j ∈ N , and (N j, (vγ)j) an SPS-game to
(N, vγ). We point out that we have for all S ∈ ΩN\{j}, ∆vj(S) = ∆v(S), ∆vj(S ∪{k, l}) =
∆v(S ∪ {j}), and, by Remark 7.1, ∆vj(S ∪ {k}) = ∆vj(S ∪ {`}) = 0. We obtain
HΓi (N, v
γ) =
(4)
∑
R⊆N,R3i
γR,i∆v(R) =
∑
S⊆N\{j}, S3i
γS,i∆v(S) +
∑
S⊆N\{j}, S3i
γS,i∆v(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`}, S3i
γjS,i∆vj(S) +
∑
S⊆Nj\{k,`}, S3i
γjS∪{k,`},i∆vj(S ∪ {k, `})
=
∑
R⊆Nj, R3i
γjR,i∆vj(R) = H
Γ
i
(
N j, (vγ)j
)
for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Since it is easy to adapt this part of the proof to show that HΓ meets PMΓ too we have
omitted this adaption.
7.7. Proof of Theorem 5.11
Let vγ ∈ VΓQ(N). By Lemma 5.10, due to property (1), and AΓ, it is sufficient to show
that ϕ is uniquely defined on games (N, vγS), vS := ∆v(S) · uS, S ∈ ΩN.
Let S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ a value that satisfies all axioms from Theorem 5.11. It
is obvious that EΓ and NOΓ imply together NΓ. Thus ϕ also satisfies NΓ. All players
j ∈ N\S are null players in vS and so ϕ is unique on vS for all j ∈ N\S by NΓ. So, by
NOΓ, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is unique on games (S, vγS).
Let γ′ ∈ ΓNQ such that
γ′T,i :=
γS,i∑
j∈T γS,j
, T ∈ ΩS, i ∈ T.
We show that
ϕΓi (S, v
γ′
S ) = ϕ
Γ
i (S, v
γ
S) for all i ∈ S. (14)
If |S| ≤ 2, we have γ′ = γ and (14) is satisfied.
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Let now |S| ≥ 3, i ∈ S, T ∈ N , T := {i, t}, t ∈ U, t /∈ N, (T, v˜γ˜) ∈ VΓQ(T ), γ˜T,k :=
γS,k, k ∈ T, v˜({i, q}) := ∆v(S), and all other coalitions are not active in v˜. Accordingly
to PSΓ, we split, possibly repeatedly, the player t into all other players j ∈ S\{i}. By
remark 5.3, we finally can obtain both games (S, vγ
′
S ) and (S, v
γ
S) and obtain by PS
Γ,
ϕΓi (S, v
γ′
S ) = ϕ
Γ
i (S, v
γ
S) for all i ∈ S since i was arbitrary as desired.
But then coincides ϕΓ on (S, vγS) also with a WTU-value ϕ
Λ on (S, vλS) ∈ VΛ(S) with
λi := γS,i for all i ∈ S which satisfies EΛ, NΛ, PSΛ, and AΛ. Therefore, by Corollary 4.19,
ϕΓ is unique on vS and Theorem 5.11 is shown.
7.8. Logical independence
Finally, we want to show the independence of the axioms used in the axiomatizations.
Remark 7.2. Let vλ ∈ VΛQ(N). The axioms in Corollary 4.20 are logically independent:
• E Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by ϕi(N, vλ) := 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies PS Λ and
M Λ but not E Λ.
• PS Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
1
|S|∆v(S) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies E Λ and M Λ but not PS Λ.
• M Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) :=
λi∑
j∈N λj
v(N) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies E Λ and PS Λ but not M Λ.
Remark 7.3. Let vλ ∈ VΛQ(N). The axioms in Corollary 4.19 are logically independent:
• E Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by ϕi(N, vλ) := 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies
N Λ\NO Λ,PS Λ, and AΛ but not E Λ.
• N Λ\NO Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
λi∑
j∈N λj
v(N) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies E Λ,PS Λ, and AΛ but not N Λ\NO Λ.
• PS Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
1
|S|∆v(S) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies E Λ,N Λ\NO Λ, and AΛ but not PS Λ.
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• AΛ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined for all i ∈ N by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =

0, if i is a null player in v,
λi∑
j∈N,
j is no null player in v
λj
v(N), otherwise,
satisfies E Λ,N Λ\NO Λ, and PS Λ but not AΛ.
Remark 7.4. The axioms in Theorem 4.23 are logically independent:
• NO Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined for all i ∈ N by
ϕi(N, v
λ) :=

0, if |N | = 1,∑
S⊆N,
S3i
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S), otherwise,
satisfies PM Λ,WS Λ, and AΛ but not NO Λ.
• PM Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, |S|≤2
λi∑
j∈S λj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N,
satisfies NO Λ,WS Λ, and AΛ but not PM Λ.
• WS Λ: The WTU-value ϕ, defined by ϕi(N, vλ) := 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies
NO Λ,PM Λ, and AΛ but not WS Λ.
• AΛ: Let R := {i ∈ N : i is no null player in v}. The WTU-value ϕ, defined for all
i ∈ N by
ϕi(N, v
λ) =
v({i}), if i ∈ N\R or |N | = 1 or |R| = 1,v({i}) + λi∑
j∈R λj
∆v(R), otherwise,
satisfies NO Λ,PM Λ, and WS Λ but not AΛ.
It is easy to transfer our considerations for logical independence above to STU-games and
STU-values. We obtain the following remark.
Remark 7.5. The axioms in Theorem 5.11 and in Theorem 5.13 are logically indepen-
dent.
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